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Abstract
This paper explores  the determinants of government  * Public pressure  has created  incentives for the
environmental  performance  at the  local level.  Chinese  township  governments to  improve their efforts in  both
township  governments,  the lowest  level in the  enforcing  environmental  regulations and providing
hierarchical government  structure,  were selected  for this  environmental  services, while the environmental  quality
exercise.  The performance  indicators used in the analyses  did not show significant impacts.
include  the efforts of enforcing government  *  Higher employment in industries tends to have a
environmental  regulations  and of providing  negative influence  on the regulatory  enforcement,  but a
environmental  services to polluting enterprises.  The  positive influence  on environmental  service provision.
performance  determinants  identified include  * A higher enforcement  effort and a lower service
environmental  performance  of upper-level governments,  provision  are associated  with higher wages the workers
local development  status, industrial employment,  income  received from industries. This implies that the industries
of workers in polluting enterprises,  local environmental  offering higher wages to the workers  are subject to more
quality, and public pressure  for environmental  quality  stringent environmental enforcement  but receive  less
improvement.  A survey  of 85 townships and interviews  environmental  services.
of 151  township government leaders  were conducted  in  * Richer townships tend to have less  regulatory
three provinces  of China. The statistical  results show  enforcement but better environmental  services.
that:
- The  environmental  performance  of upper-level
governments  in  China strongly and positively  influences
the environmental  efforts  of the township  governments.
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1. Introduction
In order to better understand and improve environmental  performance of
government, a number of studies have been conducted  on the determinants of
environmental governance.  Public choice theory has been generally employed to
address the influence of interest groups on environmental governance (e.g., Stigler,  1971;
Becker,  1983; Keohane,  1998), and it is assumed that political interest  groups are self-
interested utility maximizers.  Because of the public good characteristics  of
environmental regulation, some argue that environmental policies can hardly be fully
enforced.  Pure environmental  interest groups are difficult to organize, while other
interest groups may favor environmental benefits only because they have  some other
rents to seek (Schneider  and Volkert,  1999).
The volume of empirical  tests on the determinants is relatively small due to the
complicated  nature of policy makers'  interaction with interest groups  and the difficulties
in quantifying the political supports.  Studies by Magat, Krupnick and Harrington (1986)
developed a model to empirically test the determinants  of the U.S. EPA's effluent
standard setting and suggested  that neither economic efficiency nor industry participation
in the rulemaking process is influential.  Instead,  trade association that represented the
affected  industries and  also the profitability of the industries exerts great impacts in the
standard setting.  Cropper et al (1992)  in their analysis on U.S.  EPA decision making
suggest that the intervention by business and environmental  groups is significant.  Dion et
al (1998) found that the regulators'  behavior is a function of variables that may not be
directly related to abatement  cost and damages, but one affected by local labor market
conditions.
3So far, there seem no substantial studies conducted in developing countries.  It is
not clear when a local government faces various issues such as pollution,  poverty,
pressures from industries, residents, upper level governments, and intemational
communities, which factors have actually influenced the enforcement of environmental
policies and how.  A better understanding of these issues would greatly help design and
implement policy measures to improve environmental govemance  in developing
countries.
This study focuses on environmental performance  of Chinese township
government,  the lowest level of government in the Chinese hierarchical  government
structure,  and identifies the determinants.  The performance indicators employed in the
analyses  include the efforts of enforcing  government environmental regulations  set by the
upper-level government  agencies and the efforts of providing environmental services to
polluting enterprises.  The performance determinants  identified in this study include
environmental performance of upper-level government, local development status,
industrial employment,  income of industrial workers,  local environmental quality, public
pressure for environmental quality improvement, etc.
A survey of 85 townships  and interviews of 151  township government leaders are
conducted in three provinces of China in the year of 2000. The empirical results are
generally consistent with expectation.  The environmental performance of upper-level
government agencies in China is strongly and positively influencing  the environmental
efforts of the township governments.  Public pressure has created positive incentives for
the township governments to improve their efforts in both enforcing environmental
regulation-  an  providing envirormental  services, whilethe environmental  Tiality  did
not show significant  impacts.  Higher employment in industries tends to have a negative
influence on the regulatory enforcement efforts but a positive influence on environmental
services.  However, a higher enforcement effort and a lower service effort are associated
with higher wages the workers received from industries, which implies that in an area
where industries can offer higher wages to the workers, the industries are subject to more
stringent environmental enforcement  and receive less environmental  services.  This
4would not support a theory that richer polluters have stronger bargaining  or lobbying
power in environmental  protection in China; in fact,  the situation is the opposite.  And
finally, richer townships tend to have less regulatory enforcement but better
environmental  services by the township governments.
The next section of this paper will discuss the issues of environmental governance
in China and provide a background  for analyses.  Section 3 presents the survey and the
survey statistics.  A reduced econometric  model is presented  and discussed in Section 4,
while the modeling results are provided  in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with
discussions and summaries.
2. Environmental Governance  in China
Over the last two decades, confronted with increasingly serious environmental
threats, China's central government has continued to stress the importance  of
environmental protection by putting enormous efforts and considerable  amount of
resources. A relatively comprehensive environmental  law and regulatory  system has been
established by the central government,  and various national policy programs have been
designed and implemented in order to achieve its environmental  quality goals 2 .
Due to the great heterogeneity in various regions of China, Chinese  local
governnents have plenty of discretion powers in local administration by directing  local
economic development and providing public services3.  Environmental Protection
Bureaus (EP-Bs)  are created from provincial to municipal and county level governments.
They are the major departments of local government responsible for making and
implementing environmental regulations and deal with enterprises.  The people's
2 The policy programs include  Environmental Impact Assessment,  Three Synchromzations,  Pollution Levy
System. Pollution Control within Deadlines, Discharge  Permit Systern, Environmental  Responsibility
System, Assessment of Urban Environmental  Quality, and Centralized Control of Pollution.  For more
discussions, see Ma & Ortolano (2000).
5congresses at all levels make environmental  statutes and review the work of EPBs.  EPBs
receive budgets  from the corresponding local governments  and collect fees from
enterprises in their jurisdiction such as the pollution charges.
Despite the strong environmental protection efforts, the environmental quality in
China is generally getting worse and worse. One notorious phenomenon is that the
industrial pollution has vastly expanded from the urban to the rural areas in the past two
decades.  The burgeoning of township and village industrial enterprises (TVIEs)  in China
has boosted economic growth however leads to serious damages to the environmental
qualities in rural  China.  Nationwide,  the total output of those  1.2 million TVIEs has
exceeded  50% of the total industrial output of the country, but usually TVTEs don't have
advanced production technologies and pollution treatment facilities, and have generated
more than 50% of the total industrial pollution.
A township government,  as the lowest level of government in China, does not
have EPBs. The major environmental responsibility of a township government is to help
municipal and county EPBs enforce environmental regulations  and provide
environmental  services to industries in its jurisdiction.  Many small and scattered TVIEs
are not targeted by formal environmental  regulation programs,  and mostly it has been the
responsibility of the township government to push for pollution abatement.  However, the
township  governments have been viewed more as the protectors of the interests of the
economy in their jurisdiction when facing environmental enforcements  from the upper
level governments.  To protect for its industries, a township government can either spend
less efforts in helping enforce environmental regulations, such as spending less efforts in
collecting pollution discharge fees, or negotiate with municipal and county EPBs for less
penalties charged on the polluters.
The pollution victims are mainly local residents and they sometimes  file
complaints to the govemment.  Studies in China have shown that local environmental
3  Article  16 of Chapter 3 of the Environmental Protection Law of China states that:  the local people's
governments at various levels shall be responsible for the environmental  quality of areas under their
6policy enforcement is responding to local public demand for cleaner environment and
economic development (Wang and Wheeler,  forthcoming).  Unlike the urban residents,
due to the lack of consciousness and the lack of multiple media vehicles, these rural
Chinese people usually do not respond as actively to the local environmental pollution or
damages, and rely on their township governments to protect the environment.  There are
very few really organized  environmental  groups.  But still, the township government
leaders  do feel the public pressures  from the local residents.
3. The Survey
In order to understand and improve the environmental performances  of industries
and governments  in rural China, in 2000, we conducted a survey of 85 townships and
interviews of 151  township leaders4. The survey covers three areas in China: Danyang
Municipality of Jiangsu  Province, Liupanshui Municipality of Guizhou Province and the
northern area of Tianjin Municipality.  Danyang is located close to Yangzi River within
the coastal area of China, which enjoys favorable geographical  conditions and economic
policies. Overall, it has the best agricultural  and industrial development  among the three
sample areas.  Liupanshui is located in west Guizhou, which is a poor inner province of
southwest China.  It is one of the areas where many heavy industries have been
developed.  Those inefficient enterprises have been producing severe pollution to the
environment.  Tianjin is one of the four municipalities  in China that are administered
directly by the central government.  It is very close to Beijing.  The TVIEs in Tianjin
have produced more than 85% of total rural income, but many of these TVIEs are heavy
polluters.  Most of the industries  are still non-private enterprises.  Tianjin has strong
desire to attract more investment, but its infrastructures are not well developed.
There are complete data from 25 townships of Tianjin, 31  townships of Danyang
and 29 townships of Liupanshui.  For each township, the socio-economic  and
jurisdiction and shall take measures to improve the quality of the environment.
7environmental  statistics in the year of 1999 were compiled.  The major variables are
listed in Table 1, and the selected variables in the three areas are listed in the Table 2 for
comparison.
In each township, two leaders were interviewed.  The leaders were asked questions
about their perceptions and attitudes towards a certain socio-economic and environmental
issues. Most of these leaders have more than five years of experience working at the
townships, and are on average better educated than most township residents.  They
reported the increasing consciousness about environmental issues, and are quite
optimistic about the future improvement of environmental  status in rural China.  Many
leaders put environmental protection as one of the top two priorities for their townships
(Table 3).  Although there could be bias due to the theme of the survey that is about
environment,  it is still a quite encouraging finding that the leaders of township
governments in China, especially of those wealthier townships, have become to recognize
the very importance of environmental  protection.
4. The Model
4.1  Major Determinants
According to the common agency theory introduced by Grossman and Helpman
(1994), the incumbent government that determines the implementation of environmental
policies pursues its own goals.  From this point of view, we can look at the local
governments  as maximizers of the sum of aggregate social welfare and political
contributions  from different interest groups.  Besides the severity of local environmental
problems, three other aspects of influences on China's township governments'  discretion
on environmental protection effort can be identified: industrial group, citizen group and
the upper level governments.
4 The survey was conducted in collaboration with China State Environmental Protection Administration
84.1.1 Political  pressures  from industries
Although there are no well-identified lobby groups as in elected governments,
when making decisions on the stringency of envirornental  enforcement,  China's
township govermments  may still consider the responses from the local industries.  For
historical reasons5, Chinese township governments had been the actual owners of many
collective enterprises under its jurisdiction with a claim on the profits of these enterprises
(Wong,  1997; Oi, 1999;  and Whiting 2001).  The local governments'  administrative
budget and officials' income to some extent depend on the prosperity of these enterprises.
This fiscal system creates a lot of desire of the township governments  to put more efforts
in economic  development.  In addition,  local workers'  satisfaction with wage and
employment status is a guarantee for social stability.  Once the enforcement of
environmental  regulation imposes threats to the profits and survival of the polluting
industries,  the township governments  will be confronted with substantial pressures.
4.1.2 Public  pressure  for improving environmental  quality
In Chinese townships,  there is a clear trend of increasing public pressures on
environrnental protection  although the residents do not have many actually organized
environmental  groups.  They express their discontent mostly through complaining letters
or telephone hot lines, and sometimes  they also pay visits of government offices
(Dasgupta and Wheeler,  1996).  Chinese media have also played some significant roles in
pressing the local governments for further environmental protection by reporting
pollution information to public.
4.1.3 Pressures  from the upper level governments
The township governments'  behavior is also shaped by the cadre evaluation
system in China.  The performance criteria of the cadre evaluation system is set by the
and financially supported by the World Bank.
9upper level (in this case the county level) government to make the township party and
government leaders responsible  for the performance of administration.  Typically,
different weights are put on economic  and other public services, which reflect the
priorities of county leaders, and the township leaders will be judged by the criteria for
promotion or demotion. Whether environmental protection is on the priority list depends
on the circumstances of specific townships.  As a part of their responsibilities, the
township governments should make efforts to reduce or control environmental
degradation even when environment protection may not appear on their top priority list.
When the upper level government inspect the polluting enterprises or provide
environment-related  services, the township government may also put considerable efforts
to take similar measures.
4.1.4 Other  factors
Oates and Schwab (1988, 1991, and 1996) construct a series of models in which
local jurisdictions compete for mobile capitals in order to increase the local wage income
and to expand the local tax base.  Their models predict that public services,  including
environmental  goods, will be under-supplied in the inter-jurisdiction competition.  Qian
and Roland (1998)  in their study on China argue that in the inter-jurisdiction  competition
for foreign capital  and grants  from the central  government, local governments will have
incentives for too much infrastructure investment and too few local public goods
investment for a given budget.  However, the pressure of township government in
competing for mobile capital should be a relatively trivial factor in determining the
environmental perfornance  at the level we look at in this study, because of the small
scale of a town and the very limited budget with a township government.
The determinants  discussed above are not exclusive but complementary.  All may
contribute to the results of local governmeInts'  revealed preference for environmental
governance.  It should be an important task to clarify the causal effects of these factors,
5  The abolition of People's communes in 1983  reinstated the township as a level of rural government.
(Wong,  1997) The situation is changing when more and more TVIEs are privatized in recent years.
10and inform interest groups in China, as well as in other countries and communities, the
relevant influence of the determinants.
4.2 Hypotheses
Most of the public choice models are based on the assumption of elected
government, and the "private" motivation of local government is confined to seeking
political supports for being reelected.  The motivations of local governments in China
may deviate from this assumption.  Nonetheless,  as we discussed  in the previous section,
local governments may still seek to maintain the balance of interests of various groups
and reduce political frictions when enforcing environmental policies, if we define the
interest groups as those who exert pressures  on the overall implementation of
environmental policies,  i.e. the industrial  groups, upper level government and the
residents.
The effort of enforcing environmental policies can be viewed as one proxy of
governments'  environmental  performance  at the township level. While making new
environmental  regulations is usually beyond the responsibility of a township government,
helping the municipal and county EPBs enforce the existing regulations  is clearly a
mandate  for a township government.  Township government leaders can help put stronger
pressures on the industries for further pollution abatement by paying visits to polluting
companies,  doing pollution inspections or collecting pollution charges or fines.
Another proxy for environmental performance of township governments is the
provision of environmental  services  to the polluting companies, such as technological
information, training, and consulting services, etc..  These services are normally provided
with the government budget.
Overall we would expect:Hypothesis  1: The more severe the environmental problems are, the more
seriously a township government will consider the environmental protection work, and
therefore the higher efforts in environmental  enforcement and the more environmental
services they will provide.
Hypothesis 2: The richer the polluting plants, or the better the industrial
development,  the less a township government will be concerned  about industrial
development, and therefore, the higher efforts in enforcing environmental protection. The
impact of industrial development on the provision of environmental services may be an
empirical issue, because the better the industrial development, the more advanced
technologies they will use and therefore the less the environmental  services are needed,
however,  the more budget a township government can use to provide the services. This is
somehow different from the cases with elected governments,  where the richer the
polluting plants, the more money they can spend in lobbying, and therefore,  the less
efforts a govermment may spend on environmental enforcement.  But this later hypothesis
is not tested either.
Hypothesis  3: Public pressures should push a township  government to spend more
efforts to enforce environmental  regulations and provide environmental  services to
polluting firms.
Hypothesis 4:  If the upper level governments make more efforts in environmental
protection, a township government would put more emphases  on environmental
enforcement  and services too.
4.3 Econometric  models
The test of the hypotheses  listed above can be conducted with the following
reduced-form econometric  model:
12P = Po+  AUP+  / 2GDP  + f33Emp + ,84Wage + /35PP+  +, 6Q + f 7Location + 6
Where
P is the environmental  performance of township  government;
UP is the environmental performance  of upper level governments;
GDP is the per capita GDP of a township;
Emp is the tatio of employment in industries;
Wage is the wage of workers employed in industries;
PP is public pressure;
Q is environmental  quality of last year;
Location is a dummy variable for sample areas;
P3's are the coefficients of the explanatory  factors;
e is the error termn.
The dependent and explanatory variables are constructed  as follows:
Environmental  Performance:
As discussed  in last section,  there are two proxies for this dependent variable.
One is constructed by dividing the number of township  leaders' visits / inspections on
polluting enterprises by the number of industries (VISITTOWN),  which indicates the
effort of enforcing environmental  policies.  The other is the effort of environmental
service (SERVTOWN).  In the leaders'  interviews, we asked the leaders the existence of
various environmental services,  from which we get binary (0-1)  variables:  Training of
industrial managers by the township government,  training of industrial workers by the
township government,  consulting services by the township government,  information
services by the township government,  and financial  support.  We add up these variables
and derive as the proxies for the services provided by township level government
(SERVTOWN).
Upper Level Government Performance:
13We use the frequency of inspections on polluting enterprises by upper level
government  (VISITUP) as the proxy of upper level government influence in enforcement
equation.  It is constructed from dividing the total number of national, provincial, county
and regular inspections  on polluting enterprises by the number of  polluting enterprises in
a township.
For the service equation, we aggregate the five variables of county level services:
training, consulting, information, and financial support and derive the proxies for the
services provided by county level government (SERVEUP).  In order to control for the
similar services provided by other organizations  or academia, a variable SERVOTH  is
also constructed in a similar manner.
GDP
GDP per capita reflects the level of economic  development  and the wealth of  the
town, and is correlated with the township government budget.
Employment:
Variable Employ is constructed as a percentage of adult population  employed in
industries.  This variable tells us about the level of  industrialization  of a township, and it
is also related to the capacity of absorbing labors of the industrial enterprises.  Therefore,
it reflects the pressure from the workers when the enforcement of environmental policy
could affect their employment status and in turn the social stability.
Wage:
Wage of workers reflects  the richness of the group of people employed by
industries.  The richer the workers, the more power they would have to lobby, but the less
14protection they may receive from a government in enforcing environmental policies and
in providing environmental  services.
Public Pressure:
In the leaders'  survey, questions are asked about how they felt the public
pressures on the township government in pollution control.  A variable PRESSURE is
defined to be equal to 1 if  the leaders feel no pressure,  2 if they feel some pressure  and 3
if they feel strong pressure.  For the enforcement  equation, the variable PRESSURE is
averaged for each township because the dependent variable of the enforcement equation
(VISITTOWN)  is at the level of township.
Environmental  quality:
We use the annual average concentration  of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and total
suspended  particulate  (TSP) in the last year as the control variables of the township
environmental  quality.
Data in the year of 1999 are used for the analyses.  When there are missing values,
1998 data are used. The descriptive statistics of the variables for the enforcement
equation and the service equation  are list in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.
5. Results
The results of OLS regressions with robust standard errors are presented  in Table
6. The sample size puts a severe constraint on the precision of our statistic analyses.  For
the enforcement  equation,  68 townships can enter into the regression;  for the service
equation,  answers from  144 township  leaders can be used for the modeling.  However,  the
existence of substantial variance  in the townships we surveyed still enable the tests of  the
hypotheses and leads to some important findings:
15The performance of the upper level government is significantly, positively
correlated with that of the township government.  When the county level government or
other organizations provide more environmental  services, or there are more
environmental  inspections on the local enterprises by the upper level governments, there
will be more pressure on or collaboration from the township government.
Although not very significant, we found that the signs of coefficients of public
pressures are as expected,  with more efforts of environmental enforcement  and more
government provision of environmental services under a higher public pressure.
Employment  also has signs as expected.  When economic and environmental
factors are controlled,  more employment in the industries is associated with less
enforcement  of regulations and better services from the township government. The
township governments want to protect the employment in the industries and maintain the
social stability.
Worker's wage has a significant positive sign in the enforcement  equation and a
significant negative  sign in the service  equation; this is also as expected. The township
governments  in China put higher pressure on rich firms for pollution abatement but
provide less environmental  services.
GDP per capita has a negative, insignificant impact on enforcement efforts, but
has a significant positive effect on environmental services.  This can be understood as
that, the higher the GDP per capita, the richer the township government, and therefore the
more environmental  services the township governments can provide to polluting
enterprises, and the less likely the government would use regulatory approaches to force
pollution control.
Poor air quality does not impose great pressures on the enforcement efforts or the
provision of environmental  services.  Environmental quality should be endogenous in the
16equations, because it is also determined by the township government's environmental
performance. The air quality data in the previous year (i.e.,  1998) are used in the
analyses, which should have helped solve some of the endogeneity problem.
6. Summary and Discussion
This paper explores the determinants of government  environmental performance
at a local level. Chinese township governments,  the lowest level of government  in the
Chinese hierarchical  goveinment structure,  are selected for this exercise.  The
performance indicators  employed in the analyses include the efforts of enforcing
government environmental  regulations and the efforts of providing environmental
services to polluting enterprises.  The performance determinants identified include
environmental  performance of upper-level  governments,  local development status,
industrial employment,  income of workers in polluting companies,  local environmental
quality and public pressure for environmental quality improvement,  etc.
A survey of 85 townships and interviews  of 151  township government leaders
were conducted in three provinces in China.  The statistical  results show that the.
environmental performance  of upper-level governments  in China has strongly and
positively influenced the environmental  efforts of the township governments; public
pressure has created positive incentives for the township governments  to improve their
efforts in both enforcing  environmental regulations and providing environmental
services, while the environmental  quality did not show significant impacts; higher
employment in polluting industries tends to have a negative influence on the regulatory
enforcement efforts but a positive influence on providing environmental  services;  a
higher enforcement effort and a lower service effort are associated with higher wages the
workers received from polluting industries, which implies that industries offering higher
wages to the workers receive more stringent environmental enforcement and less
environmental services; and finally, richer townships tend to have less regulatory
enforcement but better environmental services.
17The results above at least suggest two important avenues that can help improve
the environmental performance of China township govemments, and therefore improve
the overall environmental qualities in the rural areas of China. One avenue is through the
upper-level  governments.  Capacity building of environmental  authorities in the county
and municipal level governments is one of the keys to the improvement of environmental
performance of county and municipal governments and can help improve the town
governments'  environmental performance. The other channel is through public pressure.
Environmental information disclosure, environmental education, establishment of
environmental  non-government organizations,  establishment of public participation
mechanism or programs for environmental protection may all be effective means to
enhance the capacity for the public to generate pressures on the township governments  as
well as on the polluting firms. Capacity building of local environmental authorities and
empowerment  of the public with better information and education can be two of the most
important ways to improve the environmental govemance in China as well as in other
countries.
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21Table 1. Socioeconomic  and Environmental Background of the Townships
(1999 Data)
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Urban Area (hectare)  69  59.4  47.7  10  270
Agricultural Area  (hectare)  71  2,130  4,225  40  32,146
Population  75  43,247  93,091  7,103  800,879
Number of people employed in industries  75  4,428  3,459  250  15,898
Numberoffarmers  68  13,090  11,132  1,056  51,737
Illiterate rate (%)  60  2.6  4.9  0  35
Average Life expectancy  63  74.2  6.0  61  90
GDP (10,OOOyuan)  73  51,569  56,973  1,642  255,285
Per capita  GDP (10,000  yuan/person)  73  1.79  2.10  0.09  11.5
Industrial GDP(l0,O0Oyuan)  74  47,719  59,112  362  239,462
Farrners'  annual average income (yuan/year)  71  3,002  1,617  365  7,504
Workers'  annual average income (yuan/year)  75  5,643  1,850  1,200  10,500
Total Number of industries  74  252  495  5  4072
Waste water  emission (10,000 tons)  73  367  1,416  1  11,071
COD emission ( top)_  73  304  1,417  1  11,857
TSS emission (ton)  72  953  4,686  1  38,768
Air pollution emission (10,6O;m  66  138,759  424,082  30  3160,558
SO 2 emission (ton)  73  1,755  9,659  1  81,042
Pollution levy collected(10,O0Oyuan)  73  24  78  1  648
Township inspections  on polluting enterprises  71  10  22  1  180
Table 2.  Comparison of the townships in three provinces
Mean  Liupanshui  Tianjin  Danyang  Total
Per capita GDP (yuan  10,000)  0.51  2.93  2.42  1.79
Industrialization (industrial GDP/total  GDP)  0.54  0.75  0.68  0.65
Industrial Employment / adult  opulation  0.13  0.22  0.26  0.20
Workers'  annual aerae  gincOmT(yuan  4,631  6,709  5,951  5,643
Township inspections per polluting firm  0.13  0.02  0.22  0.14
Capital of  private-owned  firms / industrial GDP  0.59  0.13  0.38  0.41
Table 3.  Top two priorities for the townships
_________Poverty  Education  Medicare  Environment  Employment  Safety  Transportation
Liupanshui  60.3  55.2  8.6  19.0  29.3  3.4  24.1
Tianjin  12.5  35.4  12.5  43.8  52.1  22.9  10.4
Danyang  24.6  19.7  21.3  57.4  39.3  23.0  9.8
Total  33.5  36.5  14.4  40.1  39.5  16.2  15.0
22Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Regressions
Variables  Definition  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.
VISITTOWN  Visits per firm by township leaders  71  0.14  0.28
VISITUP  Visits per firm by upper level  74  0.34  0.63
goverrnents
PCGDP  Per capita GDP (10,OOORMB)  73  1.8  2.1
LNWKI  Log annual average  workers'  income  75  8.6  0.4
EMPLOY  Percentage  of adult population  75  20.1  15.3
ernployed by industries
PRESSURE  Public pressure  74  2(median)  0.4
RANKSO2  Sulfur dioxide concentration  rank  75  3(median)  1.8
RANKTSP  Total suspended  particulates  75  5(median)  1.4
concentration  rank
Table 5.  Statistics of Environmental  Services
Questions  Answers
Training of industrial managers  =1  YES 117
by township  =0  NO  34
Training of industrial  managers  =1  YES  136
by upper level govermments  =0  NO  15
Training of industrial  managers  =1  YES 78
by other organizations  =0  NO  73
Training of industnal workers by  =1  YES 103
the township  =0  NO  48
Training of industrial  workers by  =1  YES  99
Up_er level govermnents  =0  NO  52
Training of industrial workers by  =I  YES  74
other organizations  =0  NO  77
Consulting services by the  =I  YES  135
townshjpgovernment  =0  NO  16
Consulting services by upper  =1  YES  141
level governments  =0  NO  10
Consulting services by other  =1  YES  94
organizations  =0  NO  57
Information services by the  =I YES  108
township g  vernment  =0  NO  43
Information  services by upper  =1  YES  120
level governnents  =0  NO  31
Information services by other  =1  YES  89
organizations  =0  NO  62
Financial  support by the  =1 YES  95
township governrment  =0  NO  56
Financial  support by upper level  =1  YES  101
government  =0  NO  50
Financial support by other  =1  YES  66
organizations  =0  NO  85
23Table 6. Regression  results for government performance
Explanatory  Dependent Variables







LNWKI  0.16*  -1.02***
(0.11)  (0.01)
EMPLOY  -0.13  1.04
(0.40)  (0.25)
PCGDP  -0.02  0.07*
(0.23)  (0.14)
PRESSURE  0.07  0.37*
(0.36)  (0.14)
RANKSO2  0.06  -0.07
(0.26)  (0.63)
RANKTSP  -0.0005  0.04
(0.99)  (0.58)
Danyang dummy  0.24  -0.16
(0.31)  (0.83)
Tianjin dummy  0.11  0.37
(0.58)  (0.61)
Constant  -1.70**  9.02***
(0.098)  (0.005)
Obs.  68  144
* Significant at the 0.15  level;  ** Significant at the 0.10  Ilevel;  *** Significant at the 0.05 level
Note: the P-values are listed in the brackets. SERVTOWN,  SERVUP and SERVOTH are
the summations of the service answers listed in table 5 by township government, upper
level government and other organizations respectively.
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